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contractual completeness depends on behavioural uncertainty (negatively), trust 
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tainty (negatively), intangibility of system specific know-how (negatively) and 
contract design capabilities (positively). The hypotheses are tested with a data 
base consisting of 52 franchise systems in Austria. The empirical results support 
the hypotheses regarding behavioural uncertainty, trust and intangible system-
specific know-how.   
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1 Introduction 
Under bounded rationality and opportunism complete contracts do not exist be-
tween the network partners (Williamson 1975; Hadfield 1990; Scott 2006). In re-
cent years researchers in organizational economics and strategic management have 
examined the question about the efficient contractual design (e.g. Joskow 1985; 
Luo 2002; Kalnins and Meyer 2004; Arino and Reuer 2005; Reuer et al. 2006; 
Ryall and Sampson 2006; Mayer and Argyres 2004; Mellewigt et al. 2007; Mes-
quita and Brush 2008; Hendrikse and Hu 2009; Hendrikse and Windsperger 
2009). Researchers in organizational economics have tried to explain the degree of 
contractual completeness by applying transaction costs and property rights reason-
ing (Crocker and Reynolds 1993; Crocker and Masten 1991; Saussier 2000; Bern-
heim and Whinston 1998; Al-Najjar 1995; Masten and Saussier 2000). Research-
ers in strategic management have examined contractual complexity that is closely 
related to contractual incompleteness (e.g. Barthelemy and Quelin 2006; Reuer 
and Arino 2007; Hansen and Higgins 2007; Hagedoorn and Hesen 2007). In or-
ganizational economics contractual completeness is a concept derived from a 
complete contract situation. A complete contract specifies all actions to be taken 
and payments made under every possible environmental situation (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992; Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). In the 1990s, the first generation of 
incomplete contracting theories (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 
1990) explain incompleteness by high enforcement costs due to exogenous verifi-
ability constraints in the contract execution period (Egglestone et al. 2000, 119; 
Scott and Triantis 2005). More recently, the second generation of incomplete con-
tracting theories (e.g. Hart and Moore 2008; Tirole 2009; Bolton and Faure-
Grimaud 2009) argues that incompleteness of contracts result primarily from ad-
aptation and endogenous verifiability problems under bounded rationality of the 
contract partners. Under uncertainty/complexity and bounded rationality (Wil-
liamson 1975) as well as intangibility of knowledge, the network partners are un-
able to specify all actions to be taken and payments made under every possible 
environmental situation. In this situation, the contract design is an adaptation 
mechanism (incentive and information processing mechanism) that assigns spe-
cific rights and control rights in order to regulate the transactions between the 
partners (Simon 1951; Gibbons 2005; Baker et al. 2009). 
Starting from this adaptation view of contract design, the objective of our paper 
is to develop a theoretical foundation of the concept of contractual completeness 
and to examine the determinants of contractual completeness in franchising by 
testing hypotheses derived from transaction costs, agency theory, property rights, 
relational governance view of governance and organizational capabilities theory. 
First, based on the transaction cost theory we argue that completeness varies nega-
tively with the franchisee’s specific investments and environmental uncertainty. 
Franchisee’s specific investments increase their quasi-rents and hence the self-
enforcing range of contracts, and environmental uncertainty prevents the franchi-
sor from specifying detailed contract terms. Second, by applying the agency-
theoretical view, we argue that contractual completeness varies negatively with 
3 
 3 
monitoring difficulties due to behavioural uncertainty. Third, we examine the 
property rights hypothesis that completeness varies negatively with intangibility of 
the franchisor’s system-specific assets. Forth, based on the relational view of gov-
ernance, we investigate the relationship between trust and the degree of contrac-
tual completeness. The complementarity hypothesis states that trust increases 
knowledge sharing and enables the franchisor to design more complete contracts; 
on the other hand, according to the substitutability hypothesis, trust decreases rela-
tional risks and results in less complete contracts. Finally, based on the organiza-
tional capability view, we examine the relationship between contract design capa-
bilities and contractual completeness. We argue that higher contract design 
capabilities result in a higher degree of contractual completeness. These hypothe-
ses are tested by using data from the Austrian franchise sector. 
The article is organized as follows: Section two investigates the concept of con-
tractual incompleteness. In section three we develop the agency cost hypothesis, 
the hypotheses based on the relational view of governance, and the property rights, 
the transactions cost hypotheses and the organizational capabilities hypothesis. Fi-
nally in section four we test these hypotheses by using data from Austria.  
2  Contractual Completeness 
Recent empirical studies on completeness and complexity of contracts show that 
contractual completeness is a heterogeneous concept without sufficient theoretical 
foundation (e. g. Parkhe 1993; Saussier 2000; Reuer and Arino 2002; 2007; Ryall 
and Sampson 2006; Furlotti 2007; Mezquita and Brush 2008). In the following, 
first we develop the concept of contractual completeness and second we examine 
the relationship between completeness and complexity of contracts.  
2.1   Contractual Completeness and Decision Rights 
Designing an efficient contract refers to the question of formulating and assigning 
specific and residual rights to the contract partners. Specific rights refer to the de-
tailed specification of decision actions in the ex ante period and residual rights re-
fer to the planning of decision procedures which enable decision making about 
specific actions in the ex post period. The partner who has non-contractible know-
ledge that generates the residual surplus should have residual decision rights, and 
the partner who has contractible knowledge should have specific decision rights 
that are explicitly stipulated in contracts (Demsetz 1998). Complete contract refers 
to the case where all actions are specified in a comprehensive contract covering 
every possible environmental situation. In this situation only specific rights are in-
cluded in the contract. Incomplete contracts refer to the situation in which the 
agents cannot fully specify the decision actions (contractual obligations) under 
  
every possible environmental situation. In this case, specific and residual rights 
are formulated and assigned in the contract. There is a trade-off on the choice be-
tween specific rights (sDR) and residual rights (rDR) which is determined by the 
contractibility of knowledge. When contractability is low, a low portion of spe-
cific rights and a high portion of residual rights are assigned to the partners, and 
when contractibility of knowledge is high, a high portion of specific and a low 
portion of residual rights are specified in contracts. The ratio between specific and 
residual rights of the partners defines the degree of contractual completeness: 
sDR/rDR. The higher the portion of specific rights compared to residual rights 
specified in the contract, the higher is the degree of contractual completeness; and 
the higher the portion of residual rights compared to specific rights,  the lower is 
the degree of contractual completeness. Hence a contract is characterized by a low 
degree of completeness under a low contractibility of knowledge, and a contract is 
characterized by a high degree of completeness under a high contractibility of 
knowledge. This approach is compatible with the adaptability view of governance 
(Simon 1951; Gibbons 2005) that formulates a trade-off between planning of deci-
sion actions (formulating specific rights) and the planning of decision procedures 
(assigning residual rights) (Bolton and Faure-Grimaud 2005). A similar trade-off 
is well known in the regulation literature on the choice between rules and stan-
dards (Kaplow 1992; Scott and Triantis 2005).  
 
2.2   Relationship between Completeness and Complexity 
After defining contractual completeness we address the question: what is the rela-
tionship between contractual complexity and contractual completeness? Recent 
studies on contractual complexities show that complexity is a heterogeneous con-
cept (e.g. Poppo and Zenger 2002; Arino and Reuer 2005; Reuer and Arino 2007; 
Hagedoorn and Hesen 2008; Barthelemy and Quelin 2006). Although these stu-
dies differ widely in their approach and definition of complexity, the main charac-
teristics of complexity concept can be defined as follows: Complex contracts have 
detailed specification of promises, obligations, responsibilities to be performed, 
procedures for monitoring and dispute resolution and determine in detail outcomes 
or outputs to be delivered. Compared to our completeness concept (sDR/rDR), 
complexity can be defined by the sum of contract provisions consisting of both 
specific decision rights (as outcome planning) and residual decision rights (as pro-
cedural planning) (sDR + rDR). Hence completeness and complexity are related as 
follows: A more complex contract can be both more or less complete. If the con-
tract has a higher number of detailed provisions regarding the partners’ actions in 
different environmental situations and a low number of provisions regarding resi-
dual decision rights, the contract has a high degree of completeness and a high de-
gree of complexity. On the other hand, if the contract has a high number of provi-
sions regarding the assignment of residual decision rights and a low number of 
provisions regarding specific rights, the contract has a high degree of complexity, 
but a low degree of completeness. Therefore, complexity and completeness only 
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go hand-in-hand when the use of assets can be specified in detail in a contract due 
to high contractibility of knowledge. On the other hand, complexity and com-
pleteness are negatively related when the use of assets is costly and difficult to 
specify in a contract due to low contractibility of knowledge, but in this situation 
the contract specifies in detail the assignment of residual decision rights. There-
fore, we do not agree with Arino and Reuer (2005) that “a contract with more spe-
cific and detailed terms is more complete than one with less specific and detailed 
terms”. 
3  Determinants of Contractual Completeness in 
Franchising 
Now we examine the determinants of contractual completeness in franchising by 
applying transaction costs theory, agency theory, property rights theory, organiza-
tional capabilities theory and the relational view of governance. 
 
3.1   Transaction Cost Theory 
Environmental  Uncertainty 
According to the transaction cost theory (Williamson 1975, 1985), environmental 
uncertainty influences the contract design as governance structure. Transaction 
costs arise due to bounded rationality under a complex and changing environment 
resulting in high environmental uncertainty (market, cultural and institutional un-
certainty). Environmental uncertainty prevents the franchisor from setting detailed 
contract terms and hence it increases the need for ex-post adaptations by allocating 
residual decision rights. The greater the environmental uncertainty, the less com-
plete is the franchise contract and the more residual rights and the less specific de-
cision rights are assigned to the franchise partners. 
 
Transaction-specific Investments 
According to the transaction cost theory, specific investments results in quasi-
rents that can be expropriated by the less dependent partner (Williamson 1985; 
Klein et al. 1978). In franchising, both the franchisor and the franchisee have to 
undertake high transaction-specific investments that increase bilateral dependency 
(Windsperger 1994). When the franchisor’s and the franchisee’s specific invest-
ments result in high quasi-rents, they likely exceed the potential hold-up gain from 
opportunistic behaviour, thereby increasing the self-enforcing range of contracts 
(Klein 1996; Klein and Murphy 1997). In this situation, the hostage effect of spe-
cific investments motivates both partners to behave cooperatively in order to real-
ize the relationship-specific quasi-rents. Consequently, the bonding effect of high 
  
bilateral specific investments increases the self-enforcing range of contract and re-
duces the requirements for specifying detailed contract terms. We can derive the 
following testable hypotheses from this transaction cost view:  
H1a: Contractual completeness is negatively related with environmental 
uncertainty 
H1b: Contractual completeness is negatively related with the franchisee’s 
specific investments. 
3.2   Agency Theory 
According to the agency theory (e.g. Lafontaine 1992; Lafontaine and Slade 
1998), asymmetric information and opportunism result in high agency costs. The 
franchisor has two possibilities of reducing agency costs: On the one hand, to re-
duce the residual loss by increasing monitoring activities and performance mea-
surement and, on the other hand, by allocating a higher fraction of residual deci-
sion rights to the franchisees (Brickley et al. 2003). The higher the behavioural 
uncertainty (due to moral hazard and adverse selection), the more residual rights 
should be transferred to the local entrepreneurs, and the less specific rights are 
formulated in contracts. Consequently, behavioural uncertainty results in mea-
surement difficulties under a multitasking environment and hence in a lower de-
gree of contractual completeness (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Bernheim and 
Whinston 1998; Egglestone et al. 2000, 110). We derive the following hypothesis: 
H2: Contractual completeness varies negatively with behavioural uncer-
tainty. 
3.3   Property Rights Theory 
According to the property rights approach, intangibility (non-contractibility) of 
knowledge assets results in allocating residual decision rights to the network part-
ners (Aghion et al. 2004; Lerner and Malmendier 2010; Windsperger 2009). The 
relationship between the intangibility of knowledge assets and the degree of con-
tractual completeness can be stated by the following proposition: The higher the 
intangibility of the partner-specific knowledge, the greater is the difficulty for the 
franchisor to explicitly specify the use of system-specific and local market know-
how in the contract, the lower is the ratio between specific and residual decision 
rights, and hence the lower is the degree of contractual completeness. We formu-
late the following hypothesis: 
H3: Contractual completeness is negatively related with intangible 
system-specific assets. 
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3.4   The Relational View of Governance 
Under the relational view of governance (Dyer and Singh 1998; Dyer and Chu 
2000; Gulati and Nickerson 2008; Mellewigt et al. 2007), there are two perspec-
tives on the impact of trust on the use of contractual provisions: (a) Substitutabili-
ty view: Knowledge-based trust is a substitute for formal contractual planning 
(Gulati 1995; Yu et al. 2006). Trust mitigates the contractual hazards due to lower 
relational risk (Roberts 2000) and hence reduces the extent of formal contract 
planning. Consequently, the franchisors are likely to use less complete contracts 
when trust exists between the network partners. (b) Complementarity view: Trust 
facilitates interorganizational knowledge sharing and enables the formulation of 
more refined contract terms as “reference points” (Hart and Moore 2008) that de-
termine the boundaries of the self-enforcing range of the contracts (Seppänen et al. 
2007; Blomqvist et al. 2005; Klein 1996). Consequently, under a high level of 
trust the franchisor uses more complete contracts because trust creates an incen-
tive for intense and open information sharing. We derive the following hypothesis: 
H4a: Substitutability view: Contractual completeness is negatively re-
lated with trust. 
H4b: Complementarity view: Contractual completeness is positively 
related with trust. 
3.4   Organizational Capability View 
The organizational capability view argues that firm-specific capabilities result in 
competitive advantage through efficient knowledge creation and knowledge ex-
ploitation (Nonaka 1994; Teece 2007; Helfat et al. 2007). In franchising, franchi-
sors develop contract design capabilities through interorganizational learning (Ar-
gyres and Meyer 2007). Prior relationships may allow for the design of more 
complete contracts because the partners learn what they need to specify in con-
tracts thereby developing contract design capabilities (Mayer and Argyres 2004; 
Ryall and Sampson 2006; Argyres et al. 2007; Bolton and Faure-Grimaud 2009). 
The older the franchise company, the more the franchisors learn about the applica-
tion of system-specific and the local market knowlege, and the higher are the fran-
chisor’s contract design capabilities, i. e. the capabilities to specify more refined 
contract. We formulate the following hypothesis: 
H5: Contractual completeness is positively related with interorganiza-
tional learning. 
  
4  Empirical Analysis  
4.1   Sample and Data Collection 
The empirical setting for testing these hypotheses is the franchising sector in Aus-
tria. We started our empirical work by obtaining the list of all franchise systems in 
Austria from the Austrian Franchise Association (AFA). AFA identified a total of 
260 franchised systems in Austria in 2004. After several preliminary steps in ques-
tionnaire development, including interviews with franchisors and franchise con-
sultants and the representatives of the AFA, the final version of the questionnaire 
was sent out by mail to the general managers of the franchise systems in June 
2005 and September 2005. The questionnaire took approximately 15 minutes to 
complete on average. We received 52 completed responses; hence the response 
rate is 20%. This low response rate might be due to the relatively long question-
naire (7 pages). The general managers (CEOs) as respondents to the survey were 
the key informants of the franchise systems. Key informants should occupy roles 
that make them knowledgeable about the issues being researched (John and Reve 
1982). Since the general managers as top decision makers in the franchise systems 
are involved in all contractual decisions (including the design of franchise con-
tracts), they were judged to be the most suitable respondents. 
In implementing the survey we took several steps to ensure a good response 
rate, ranging from including a support letter from the president of the Austrian 
Franchise Association to conducting multiple follow-ups with non-respondents 
(Fowler 1993). We examined the non-response bias by investigating whether the 
results obtained from analysis were driven by differences between the group of 
respondents and the group of non-respondents. Non-response bias was estimated 
by comparing early versus late respondents (Armstrong and Overton 1977), where 
late respondents serve as proxies for non-respondents. No significant differences 
emerged between the two groups of respondents. In addition, based on Podsakoff 
et al. (2003), we used Harman’s single-factor test to examine whether a significant 
amount of common method variance exists in the data. After we conducted factor 
analysis on all items and extracted more than one factor with eigenvalues greater 
than one, we felt confident that common method variance is not a serious problem 
in our study. 
4.2 Measurement 
To test the hypotheses the following variables are important: contractual com-
pleteness, transaction-specific investments of the franchisee, behavioral uncertain-
ty, intangible system-specific assets, environmental uncertainty, trust and contract 
design capabilities (see appendix). 
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Degree of contractual completeness  
The indicator of COMPLETENESS is a proxy for the degree of contractual com-
pleteness defined by the ratio between specific and residual decision rights. Hence 
it addresses the extent to which specific rights of the franchisor and the franchisee 
are included in the contract. The general managers were asked to rate the degree 
of contractual completeness on a five-point scale: “The cooperation between the 
franchisor and the franchisee is regulated in a detailed manner in the contract”. 
The higher the indicator, the higher is the degree of contractual completeness.  
 
Transaction specific investments of the franchisee 
Transaction specific investments (SPECIFIC_INVESTMENTS) reduce the re-
quirements for formulating specific contract terms because they increase the self-
enforcing range of the contracts (Klein 1996). The franchisee’s transaction-
specific investments are measured by the initial investments (including initial 
fees). 
Behavioral uncertainty 
Behavioral uncertainty (BEHAV_UNCERTAINTY) results in measurement diffi-
culties and monitoring costs under asymmetric information. Higher monitoring 
costs are negatively related to contractual completeness (Egglestone et al. 2000, 
110). Consistent with previous studies we operationalize behavioral uncertainty 
with a four-item scale (e.g. Anderson 1985; John, Weitz 1989; Heide, John 1990) 
(see appendix). The reliability of this scale was assessed by Cronbach’s alpha 
(0.83). 
 
 
Environmental uncertainty 
According to Crocker and Reynolds (1993) and Ryall and Sampson (2009), con-
tract duration is positively related with environmental uncertainty. We use con-
tract duration as indicator of environmental uncertainty (ENV_UNCERTAINTY). 
This indicator represents the difficulty regarding preplanning of the franchisor’s 
and franchisees’ actions under a complex and changing environment. The longer 
the contract duration, the more difficult and costly is the planning of decision ac-
tions in the ex ante period, and the lower is the degree of contractual complete-
ness. 
Intangible system-specific assets 
Based on indicators used in earlier studies (e.g. Windsperger 2004) we used train-
ing days (franchisees and franchisee’s employees) (INTANGIBLE_SYSTEM 
ASSETS) as proxy for the franchisor’s intangible system-specific assets. The 
number of training days is an indicator for intangibility of the franchisor’s system-
specific know-how. The assumption behind this measure is that as intangibility of 
knowledge assets increases, so does the number of days of face-to-face interac-
tion. Consistent with the view of Simonin (1999a,b), the higher the degree of in-
tangibility, the more tacit (less contractible) is the system-specific know-how, and 
the more personal knowledge transfer methods are used, such as meetings, coach-
ing and training.  
  
Trust 
Under the relational view of governance trust may be a substitute for or comple-
ment of formal contract planning. Trust is a very heterogeneous concept (e. g. Le-
vin and Cross 2004; Seppänen et al. 2007; Lazzarini et al. 2008). We operational-
ize trust (TRUST) with a four-item scale (see Appendix) (Cronbach alpha = 0.86).  
 
Contract Design Capabilities 
Prior relationships may allow for the design of more complete contracts because 
the franchisor develops contract design capabilities (Argyres et al. 2007; Bolton 
and Faure-Grimaud 2009). Experience of the franchise company (as number of 
years since the opening of the first franchise outlet in Austria) is a proxy for inter-
organizational learning and developing contract design capabilities (CD-
CAPABILITIES). 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3   Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive data for the sample in Austria.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum   Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Dev. 
INITIAL INVESTMENTS 
(incl. initial FEES) 
44 .00     590000.00 81546.09    1.18956E5 
TRAINING DAYS (Franchisees 
and employees) 
45 2.00 68.50 15.0000 14.76097 
There is a lot of trust between 
the partners 
49 3 5 4.27 .700 
There is an atmosphere of open-
ness and sincerity 
49 2 5 4.35 .751 
Information exchange is more 
than agreed 
49 3 5 4.20 .763 
Partnership  is on the basis of 
cooperation 
49 3 5 4.59 .574 
TRUST 50 3.20 5.00 4.4040 .54733 
It is difficult to predict the be-
haviour of the outlet manager 
(or franchisee) 
 
51 
 
1 
 
5 
 
2.59 
 
1.004 
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It is difficult to control the be-
haviour of the outlet manager 
(or franchisee) 
51 1 5 2.10 1.044 
It is difficult to evaluate per-
formance of the outlet manager 
(or franchisee) 
51 1 4 2.25 .744 
It is difficult to measure the lo-
cal services 
51 1 5 2.08 .977 
BEHAVIOURAL 
UNCERTAINTY 
51 1.00 4.25 2.2549 .77054 
CD-CAPABILITIES (Age of 
the Franchise System) 
50 1 29.00 9.8400 7.58183 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
UNCERTAINTY (Contract Du-
ration in years) 
 
47 
 
1 
 
20 
 
7.83 
 
4.493 
 
To test the hypotheses we carry out a regression analysis. We conduct an OLS re-
gression analysis with COMPLETENESS as dependent variable. The explanatory 
variables refer to trust (TRUST), behavioral uncertainty (BEH_UNCERTAINTY), 
environmental uncertainty (ENV_UNCERTAINTY), franchisee’s specific in-
vestments (SPECIFIC_INVESTMENTS), intangible system-specific assets 
(INTANGIBLE_SYSTEM ASSETS) and contract design capabilities (CD-
CAPABILITIES). Table 2 presents the correlations of the variables used in the re-
gression analysis. In addition, the variance inflation factors are well below the 
rule-of-thumb cut-off of 10 (Neter et al. 1985). We do not find any collinearity in-
dication.  
 
Table 2. Correlations 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ENVIR_ 
UNCERTAINTY 
1.000       
BEHAV_ 
UNCERTAINTY 
-.249 1.000      
TRUST .320* -.304* 1.000     
CD-   
CAPABILITIES 
.022 -.011 .122 1.000    
INTANGIBLE     
SYSTEM_ 
ASSETS 
.176 -.365* .217 .001 1.000 
  
SPECIFIC_ 
INVESTMENTS 
.478** -.466** .269 .291 .259 1.000  
COMPLETENESS .063 -.296* .302* .105 .009 .168 1.000 
  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
We estimate the following regression equation: 
COMPLETENESS =α + β 1TRUST+ β 2BEHAV_UNCERTAINTY+ 
β 3ENV_UNCERTAINTY + β 4SPECIFIC_INVESTMENTS+ 
β 5INTANGIBLE_SYSTEM ASSETS + β 6CD-CAPABILITIES 
 
According to the relational view of governance, COMPLETENESS varies posi-
tively or negatively with trust. Under substitutability view, trust reduces relational 
risk and decreases contractual completeness; under complementarity view, trust 
enables knowledge sharing and increases contractual completeness. According to 
the agency theory, completeness varies negatively with behavioral uncertainty. 
Based on transaction cost theory, environmental uncertainty is negatively related 
with completeness because it is not possible or very costly for the franchisor to 
preplan all relevant actions under a complex and changing transactional environ-
ment. Furthermore, completeness varies negatively with franchisees’ specific in-
vestments due to the hostage effect of franchisees’ specific investments. Accord-
ing to the property rights view, completeness varies negatively with intangibility 
of system-specific assets. Finally, the development of contract design capabilities 
is positively related with completeness of contracts, due to interorganizational 
learning.  
Table 4 reports the results of regression analysis. The coefficient of trust 
(TRUST) is positive and highly significant. This is consistent with our comple-
mentarity view that an increase in trust enables the franchisor to design more re-
fined contract terms. The coefficient of behavioral uncertainty 
(BEHAV_UNCERTAINTY) is negative and significant. This implies that high 
behavioral uncertainty results in high monitoring costs preventing the franchisor 
from designing more complete contracts. The coefficient of intangible system-
specific assets (INTANGIBLE_SYSTEM ASSETS) is negative and significant 
indicating that higher intangibility of system-specific assets results in less com-
plete contracts. In addition, the coefficient of contract design capabilities (CD-
CAPABILITIES) is compatible with the view that interorganizational learning in-
creases contractual completeness. Furthermore, the coefficient of environmental 
uncertainty (ENV_UNCERTAINTY) is negative as expected but not significant. 
Finally, the coefficient of franchisee’s specific investments 
(SPECIFIC_INVESTMENTS) is not significant.  
 
      Table 4. Regression results  
COMPLETENESS   
Intercept 2.438 
 (1.514) 
TRUST 0.709** 
13 
 13 
 (0.325) 
BEHAV_UNCERTAINTY -0.579** 
 (0.22) 
ENVIR_UNCERTAINTY -0.042 
 (0.05) 
SPECIFIC_INVESTMENTS 3.219E-007 
 (0.000) 
INTANGIBLE     
SYSTEM_ASSETS 
 
       -0.039** 
 
(0.015) 
CD-CAPABILITIES 0.225 
 (0.157) 
 
F = 4.041*** 
 
Adj. R Square  = 
0.378 
 
N=44 
         *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05;  *p < 0.1;  values in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
 
4.4   Discussion and Conclusion 
The goal of the paper is to explain the degree of contractual completeness in fran-
chising by developing and testing hypotheses derived from transaction cost theory, 
agency theory, property rights theory, organizational capability theory and the re-
lational view of governance. First, starting from the recent literature on contrac-
tual completeness and complexity that shows that contractual completeness is a 
heterogeneous concept without sufficient theoretical foundation, we develop the 
concept of contractual completeness based on the property rights view of alloca-
tion of specific and residual decision rights between contract partners. Contractual 
completeness is defined by the ratio between specific rights and residual decision 
rights stipulated in contracts. The higher (lower) this ratio, the more (in-) complete 
is the contract. Second, we develop and test the following hypotheses about con-
tractual completeness in franchising: According to the agency theory, complete-
ness varies negatively with behavioural uncertainty. The results provide support 
for the hypothesis that measurement difficulties, due to behavioural uncertainty, 
result in a lower degree of contractual completeness. Based on the relational view 
of governance, we investigate the relationship between trust and the degree of 
contractual completeness. Our data support the complementarity hypothesis that 
trust enables the franchisor to design more complete contracts. Further we exam-
ine the property rights hypothesis that completeness varies negatively with intan-
gibility of system-specific assets. The results indicate that non-contractible sys-
  
tem-specific know-how results in difficulties explicitly specifying the use of sys-
tem know-how in the franchise contract and hence in a lower degree of contractual 
completeness. In addition, based on the organizational capability view, we show 
that contract design capabilities and contractual completeness are positively re-
lated but the coefficient is not significant. Finally, the data from the Austrian fran-
chise sector do not confirm the transaction costs hypotheses that completeness 
varies negatively with the franchisee’s specific investments and environmental 
uncertainty.  
How does our study extend the results in the literature? The major contribution 
of our study is first the clarification of the relationship between contractual com-
pleteness, decision rights, and complexity, and second the explanation of the de-
terminants of contractual completeness in franchise relationships by applying 
transaction cost theory, agency theory, property rights theory, relational view of 
governance and organizational capability theory.  
What are the business/managerial implications of (the degree of) contractual 
completeness in franchising? We limit ourselves to two observations. First, the de-
sign of contracts is the most important organizational task in franchising. A choice 
has therefore to be made which aspects to include in the contract. Our study may 
be helpful in this respect because it has identified a number of the determinants of 
contractual completeness and the direction of their effect. Second, the coverage of 
the business format by formulating specific and residual rights varies between 
franchises. Kaufmann and Eroglu (1998) stated therefore that “[o]f the many types 
of management issues faced by franchisors, perhaps one of the most difficult is de-
fining the appropriate boundaries of their format, i.e., maintaining the required 
level of uniformity for the system to obtain economies of scale, while avoiding the 
danger of stifling efficient local market adaptation”. Our study has provided a start 
to make concepts like the boundary of a business format and the required level of 
uniformity measurable by proposing to use the various rights specified in actual 
franchise contracts. 
However, this study has important limitations: Due to the small sample size the 
generalizability of the results is limited; further research analysing data from other 
countries with a larger number of franchise systems would help ascertain gener-
alizability of our research results. In addition, environmental uncertainty should be 
measured by a multiple-item scale since contract duration may result in endogen-
ity problems. Furthermore, the measurement of contractual completeness is not 
without limitations; it is a first step to measure contractual completeness. In future 
studies, we will use a multiple-item scale that differentiates between specific deci-
sion rights and residual decision rights specified in the franchise contract. In addi-
tion, the development of a more valid indicator for contractual completeness re-
quires the use of more objective measures based on contract data. The collection 
of contract data is an important issue for future research.  
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Appendix: Measures of Variables 
COMPLETENESS   
(contractual completeness) 
 
 
 
The franchisor has to evaluate contractual completeness on a 5 
point scale (1, strongly disagree; …5, strongly agree): 
The cooperation between the franchisor and the franchisee is 
regulated in a detailed manner in the contract. 
TRUST (trust) 
 
Coefficient alpha: 0.86 
The franchisor has to evaluate trust on a 5 point scale  
(1, strongly disagree; …5, strongly agree): 
There is a lot of trust between the partners. 
There is an atmosphere of openness and sincerity. 
Information exchange is more than agreed. 
Cooperation is on the basis of partnership. 
BEHAV_UNCERTAINTY  
(behavioral uncertainty) 
 
Coefficient alpha: 0.827 
The franchisor has to evaluate behavioral uncertainty on a 5 point 
scale (1, strongly disagree; …5, strongly agree): 
It is difficult to predict the behaviour of the outlet manager (or 
franchisee). 
  
 
 
It is difficult to control the behaviour of the outlet manager (or 
franchisee). 
It is difficult to evaluate performance of the outlet manager (or 
franchisee). 
It is difficult to measure the local services. 
ENVIR_UNCERTAINTY  
(environmental uncertainty) 
Environmental uncertainty is measured by the contract duration 
(in years). 
SPECIFIC_INVESTMENTS 
(franchisee’s specific invest-
ments) 
Franchisee’s specific investments are measured by the sum of ini-
tial fees and initial investments. 
INTANGIBLE_SYSTEM 
ASSETS (intangible system-
specific assets of the franchisor) 
Total training days of the franchisee and its employees (per year). 
CD-CAPABILITIES  
(contract design capabilities) 
Natural log of years since opening the first franchise outlet in Aus-
tria. 
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